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Abstract
Deontic logic sentences define what an agent ought to do when faced with a set of
norms. These norms may come into conflict such that a priority ordering over them
is necessary to resolve these conflicts. Dung’s seminal paper raised the — so far open
— challenge of how to use formal argumentation to represent non monotonic log-
ics, highlighting argumentation’s value in exchanging, communicating and resolving
possibly conflicting viewpoints in distributed scenarios. In this paper, we propose a
formal framework to study various properties of prioritized non monotonic reasoning
in formal argumentation, in line with this idea. More precisely, we show how a version
of prioritized default logic and Brewka-Eiter’s construction in answer set program-
ming can be obtained in argumentation via the weakest and last link principles. We
also show how to represent Hansen’s recent construction for prioritized normative
reasoning by adding arguments using weak contraposition via permissive norms, and
their relationship to Caminada’s “hang yourself” arguments.
Keywords: Abstract argumentation theory, prioritized normative reasoning.
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Alchourro´n and Makinson [1] on hierarchical normative sys-
tems, in which a priority or strength is associated with the authority which
promulgated a norm, reasoning with priorities of norms has been a central chal-
lenge in deontic logic. This has led to a variety of non-monotonic formalisms
for prioritized reasoning in deontic logic, including a well known approach from
prioritized default logic (PDL) and answer set programming — recently given
argumentation semantics [13] (and to which we refer as the greedy approach);
an approach by Brewka and Eiter [3] (which we refer to as the Brewka-Eiter
construction); and a recent approach in hierarchical normative reasoning by
Hansen [9], which we refer to as the Hansen construction. Given as input a set
of norms with priorities, these approaches may produce different outputs. Con-
sider the following benchmark example introduced by Hansen [9], and which
results in the prioritized triangle.
Example 1.1 [Prioritized triangle – Hansen [9]]
Imagine you have been invited to a party. Before the event, you receive
several imperatives, which we consider as the following set of norms.
- Your mother says: if you drink (p), then don’t drive (¬x).
- Your best friend says: if you go to the party (a), then you’ll drive (x) us.
- An acquaintance says: if you go to the party (a), then have a drink with me
(p).
We assign numerical priorities to these norms, namely ‘3’, ‘2’ and ‘1’ cor-
responding to the sources ‘your mother’, ‘your best friend’ and ‘your acquain-
tance’, respectively. Whereas default and answer set programming-based ap-
proaches derive p, Hansen [9] argues convincingly that in normative reasoning
p should not be derived. Meanwhile, the greedy approach and the Hansen
construction return x, but the Brewka-Eiter construction returns ¬x.
Given that these different non-monotonic approaches yield different results,
and further given Young and colleagues [13] representation result for prioritized
default logic in argumentation, we wish to investigate the representation of such
prioritized normative systems in formal argumentation. Therefore, the research
question we answer in this paper is: how can Brewka-Eiter’s and Hansen’s
approaches for prioritized non monotonic reasoning be represented in formal
argumentation?
In this paper, we aim to make as few commitments as possible to specific
argumentation systems. We therefore build on Tosatto et al. [11]’s abstract
normative systems, and a relatively basic structured argumentation framework
which admits undercuts and rebuts between arguments, and allows for prior-
ities between rules making up arguments. We show that different approaches
to lifting priorities from rules to arguments (based on the weakest and last link
principles) allow us to capture the greedy and Brewka-Eiter approaches, while
the introduction of additional arguments through the principle of weak contra-
position, or through so called hang yourself arguments, allows us to obtain the
Hansen construction.
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A key point of our formal framework is that it addresses the challenge
raised by Dung [6] aiming at representing non-monotonic logics through for-
mal argumentation. In particular, argumentation is a way to exchange and
communicate viewpoints, thus having an argumentation theory representing a
non-monotonic logic is desirable for such a logic, in particular when the argu-
mentation theory is simple and efficient. Note that it is not helpful for the
development of non-monotonic logics themselves, but it helps when we want to
apply such logics in distributed and multiagent scenarios.
The layout of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce our formal frame-
work, and the three constructions. Second, we present our representation re-
sults, and demonstrate the relation between weak contraposition and hang
yourself arguments. Finally, in concluding remarks, we discuss the main contri-
butions of our approach, and highlight the future directions to be investigated.
2 Prioritised abstract normative system
In this section, we introduce the notion of prioritized abstract normative system
(PANS) and three different approaches to compute what normative conclusions
hold (referred to as an extension). A PANS captures the context of a system
and the normative rules in force in such a system, together with a set of permis-
sive norms which identify exceptions under which the normative rules should
not apply. There is an element in the universe called >, contained in every
context, and in this paper we consider only a finite universe. A PANS also
encodes a ranking function over the normative rules to allow for the resolution
of conflicts.
Tosatto et al. [11] introduce a graph based reasoning framework to classify
and organize theories of normative reasoning. Roughly, an abstract normative
system (ANS) is a directed graph, and a context is the set of nodes of the graph
containing the universe. In a context, an abstract normative system generates
or produces an obligation set, a subset of the universe, reflecting the obligatory
elements of the universe.
Based on the notion of abstract normative system defined by Tosatto and
colleagues [11], a PANS is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 [Prioritized abstract normative system] A prioritized abstract
normative system PANS is a tuple P = 〈L,N, P,A, r〉, where
• L = E ∪ {¬e | e ∈ E} ∪ {>} is the universe, a set of literals based on some
finite set E of atomic elements;
• N ⊆ L× L is a set of ordinary norms;
• P ⊆ L× L is a set of permissive norms;
• A ⊆ L is a subset of the universe, called a context, such that for all a in E,
{a,¬a} 6⊆ A;
• r : N ∪ P → IN is a function from the norms to the natural numbers;
and where N ∩ P = ∅.
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Ordinary norms are of the kind “if you go to the party, then you should
have a drink with me”, whilst permissive norms take the form of statements
such as “if you go to the party, then you don’t have to have a drink with me”.
Both ordinary norms and permissive norms are conditional norms, requiring
some condition to hold (e.g., going to the party) before their conclusion can be
drawn. To distinguish the ordinary norms of N from the permissive norms of
P , we write (a, x) for the former and 〈a, x〉 for the latter, where a, x ∈ L are
the antecedent and conclusion of the norm respectively. When no confusion
can arise, a permissive norm is also represented as (a, x). Let u, v ∈ N ∪ P
be two norms, we say that v is at least as preferred as u (denoted u ≤ v) if
and only if r(u) is no more than r(v) (denoted r(u) ≤ r(v)), where r(u) is also
called a rank of u. We write u < v or v > u iff u ≤ v and v 6≤ u. Given a
norm u = (a, x) or 〈a, x〉, we write ant(u) for a to represent the antecedent of
the norm, and con(u) for x to represent the conclusion of the norm. We say
that a PANS is totally ordered if and only if the ordering ≤ over N ∪ P is
antisymmetric, transitive and total. We assume that the set of norms is finite.
For a ∈ L, we write a = ¬a if and only if a ∈ E, and a = e for e ∈ E if and
only if a = ¬e. Given a set S, we use S 0 ⊥ to denote that @a, b ∈ S s.t. a = b,
i.e., a and b are not contradictory.
Example 2.2 [Prioritized triangle [9]] In terms of Def. 2.1, the prioritized
triangle can be represented as a PANS P1 = 〈L,N , P , A, r〉, where
• L = {a, p, x,¬a,¬p,¬x},
• N = {(a, p), (p,¬x), (a, x)},
• P = ∅, A = {a,>},
• r((a, p)) = 1, r((p,¬x)) = 3, and r((a, x)) = 2.
Figure 1 visualizes the prioritized triangle, with the crossed line between a and
¬x denoting the norm (a, x).
a
p
¬x
1
2
3 A3A2A1A0
[a] [(a,p)] [(a,p),(p,¬x)] [(a,x)]
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The prioritized triangle (a), with the related arguments and the attacks among
them visualized as directed arrows (b).
Given a totally ordered PANS, existing approaches of reasoning with pri-
oritized norms may give different consequences. We consider three approaches
(among others) that give three distinct consequences to the prioritized trian-
gle example: the greedy approach of PDL, the Brewka-Eiter construction and
the Hansen construction. Existing approaches consider only PANSs without
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permissive norms (i.e., P = ∅). In this paper, we extend these approaches to
PANSs with permissive norms. So, the following definitions are applicable for
both cases when P = ∅ and P 6= ∅.
First, a greedy approach (as used in PDL) always applies the norm with
the highest priority among those which can be applied if this does not make
the extension inconsistent.
Definition 2.3 [Greedy approach] Given a totally ordered PANS P = 〈L,
N,P,A, r〉, a norm u ∈ N ∪ P and a set S ⊆ L:
• We say that u is acceptable with respect to S, if and only if the following
conditions holds:
· ant(u) ∈ S,
· S ∪ {con(u)} 0 ⊥, and
· @v ∈ N ∪P such that v > u, v has not been previously applied, ant(v) ∈ S,
and S ∪ {con(v)} 0 ⊥.
• Let GP : 2L → 2L be a function, such that GP(S) = S∪{con(u)} if u ∈ N∪P
is acceptable with respect to S; otherwise, GP(S) = S.
• Given A, GP has a fixed point (denoted as G∞P (A), such that the extension
of P by using the Greedy approach (denoted as Greedy(P)) is equal to:
{a ∈ G∞P (A) | ∃{b1, . . . , bk} ⊆ G∞P (A) : b1 ∈ A,
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, (bi, bi+1) ∈ N,
and (bk, a) ∈ N}
Note that since P is totally ordered, using the Greedy approach guarantees
that there is a unique extension.
Building on the Greedy approach, Brewka and Eiter [3] defined the following
construction.
Definition 2.4 [Brewka-Eiter construction] Given a totally ordered PANS
P = 〈L,N , P , A, r〉, and a set X ⊇ A:
• Let PX=〈L,N ′, P ′, A, r′〉, where
· N ′ = {(>, l2) | (l1, l2) ∈ N, l1 ∈ X} is the set of ordinary norms,
· P ′ = {〈>, l2〉 | 〈l1, l2〉 ∈ P, l1 ∈ X} is the set of permissive norms,
· and r′((>, l2)) = r((l1, l2)) for all (l1, l2) ∈ N ∪P are priorities over norms.
• If X = Greedy(PX), then X is an extension of P by using the Brewka-Eiter
construction, denoted as X ∈ BnE(P).
Our definition (Def. 2.4) and the original formalism of Brewka and Eiter [3]
are different, in the sense that in our definition we do not make use of default
negation to represent the exceptions, i.e., the defeasibility of a (strict) rule,
but we use defeasible rules and the notion of applicability of such rules. This
means that the correct translation of the prioritized triangle of Example 2.2
ends up as the following logic program 1 :
1 Note that in [3] r0 < r3 means that r0 has higher priority than r3.
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r0 : a.
r1 : p : - not ¬p, a.
r2 : x : - not ¬x, a.
r3 : ¬x : - not x, p.
r0 < r3 < r2 < r1
If priorities are disregarded, then this logic program has two answer sets:
{a, p, x} and {a, p,¬x}. Thus, considering priorities, the former is the unique
preferred answered set, as pointed out in Example 2.6 below.
Similarly, Hansen [9] defined the following construction by building on the
Greedy approach.
Definition 2.5 [Hansen construction] Given a totally ordered PANS P =
〈L,N , P , A, r〉:
• Let T = {u1, u2, . . . , un} be a linear order on N ∪ P such that u1 > u2 >
· · · > un.
• For all R ⊆ N ∪P , let R(A) = {x | x can be derived from A with respect to
R}.
• We define a set Φ as Φ = Φn such that
· Φ0 = ∅,
· Φi+1 = Φi ∪ {ui}, if A ∪ R(A) 0 ⊥ where R = Φi ∪ {ui}; otherwise,
Φi+1 = Φi.
• The extension of P by using Hansen construction (denoted as Hansen(P)) is
equal to Greedy(P ′), where P ′ = 〈L,N ′, P ′, A, r〉, in which N ′ = N ∩Φ and
P ′ = P ∩ Φ.
Example 2.6 [Prioritised triangle: extensions] Regarding P1 in Example 2.2,
we get three different extensions when using these approaches. For the greedy
approach we obtain S1 = {a}, G1P1(S1) = {a, x}, G∞P1(S1) = G2P1(S1) ={a, p, x}. For the Brewka-Eiter construction, given X = {a, p,¬x}, we
have PX1 = 〈L,N ′, P ′, A, r′〉, where N ′ = {(>, p), (>, x), (>,¬x)}, P ′ = ∅,
r′((>, p)) = 1, r′((>,¬x)) = 3 and r′((>, x)) = 2; Greedy(PX1 ) = X. Since
no other set could be an extension, BnE(P) = {{a, p,¬x}}. Finally, for
the Hansen construction, let u1 = (p,¬x), u2 = (a, x), and u3 = (a, p),
and T = {u1, u2, u3}. Then Φ0 = ∅, Φ1 = {u1}, Φ2 = {u1, u2}, and
Φ = Φ3 = Φ2 = {u1, u2}. So, P ′1 = 〈L,N ′, P ′, A, r〉, where N ′ = {u1, u2},
P ′ = ∅. Since Greedy(P ′1) = {a, x}, Hansen(P1) = {a, x}.
3 Argumentation theory for a PANS
In this section, we introduce an argumentation theory on prioritised norms.
This theory builds on ideas from ASPIC+ [10]. Given a PANS, we first define
arguments and defeats between them, then compute extensions of arguments
in terms of Dung’s theory [6], and from these, obtain conclusions.
In a PANS, an argument is an acyclic path in the graph starting in an
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element of the context. We assume minimal arguments — no norm can be
applied twice in an argument and no redundant norm is included in an argu-
ment. Permissions are undercutting arguments containing at least one permis-
sive norm. We use concl(α) to denote the conclusion of an argument α, and
concl(E) = {concl(α) | α ∈ E} for the conclusions of a set of arguments E.
Definition 3.1 [Arguments and sub-arguments] Let P = 〈L,N, P,A, r〉 be a
PANS.
A context argument in P is an element a ∈ A, and its conclusion is
concl(a) = a.
An ordinary argument in P is an acyclic path α = [u1, . . . , un], n ≥ 1, such
that:
(i) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ui ∈ N ;
(ii) ant(u1) ∈ A;
(iii) con(ui) = ant(ui+1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
(iv) {ant(u1), . . . , ant(un)} 0 ⊥; and
(v) @i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i 6= j and ui = uj .
Moreover, we have that concl(α) = con(un).
An undercutting argument in P is defined in terms of an ordinary argu-
ment, by replacing the first condition with (1’) ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
ui ∈ P .
The sub-arguments of argument [u1, . . . , un] are, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [u1, . . . , ui].
Note that context arguments do not have sub-arguments.
The set of all arguments constructed from P is denoted as Arg(P). For
readability, [(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)] may be written as (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an).
The set of sub-arguments of an argument α is denoted as sub(α).
We follow the tradition in much of preference-based argumentation [2,10],
and use defeat as the relation among arguments on which the semantics is based,
whereas attack is used for a relation among arguments which does not take the
priorities among arguments into account. To define the defeat relation among
prioritized arguments, we assume that only the priorities of the norms are used
to compare arguments. In other words, we assume a lifting of the ordering on
norms to a binary relation on sequences of norms, written as α  β, where α
and β are two arguments, indicating that α is at least as preferred as β.
There is no common agreement about the best way to lift ≥ to . In ar-
gumentation, two common approaches are the weakest and last link principles,
combined with the elitist and democratic ordering [10]. However, Young and
colleagues [13] show that elitist weakest link cannot be used to calculate ,
and proposes a disjoint elitist order which ignores shared rules. Based on these
ideas we define the orderings between arguments according to the weakest link
and last link principles (denoted as w and l respectively) as follows.
Definition 3.2 [Weakest link and last link] Let P = 〈L,N , P , A, r〉 be a
PANS, and α = [u1, . . . , un] and β = [v1, . . . , vm] be two arguments in Arg(P).
Let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}. By the weakest link principle,
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α w β iff ∃v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1 s.t. ∀u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2, v ≤ u. By the last link principle,
α l β iff un ≥ vm.
When the context is clear, we write  for w or l. We write α  β for
α  β without β  α.
Given a way to lift the ordering on norms to an ordering on arguments, the
notion of defeat can be defined.
Definition 3.3 [Defeat among arguments] Let P = 〈L,N , P,A, r〉 be a PANS.
For all α, β ∈ Arg(P),
α attacks β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
(i) concl(α) = concl(β′)
α defeats β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
(i) concl(α) = concl(β′) and
(ii) α is a context argument, or β′ 6 α.
The set of defeats between the arguments in Arg(P) is denoted as Def(P,).
In what follows, an argument α = [u1, . . . , un] with ranking on norms is
denoted as u1 . . . un : r(α), where r(α) = (r(u1), . . . , r(un)).
Example 3.4 [Prioritised triangle, continued] Consider the prioritised triangle
in Example 2.2. We have the following arguments, visualized in Figure 1.b:
A0 a (context argument)
A1 (a, p) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 (a, p)(p,¬x) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 (a, x) : (2) (ordinary argument)
We have that A2 attacks A3 and vice versa, and there are no other attacks
among the arguments. Moreover, A2 defeats A3 if (2) 6 (1, 3) (last link), and
A3 defeats A2 if (1, 3) 6 (2) (weakest link).
It is worth mentioning that Dung [7] proposes the notion of a normal attack
relation, which satisfies some desirable properties that cannot be satisfied by
the ASPIC+ semantics, i.e., the semantics of structured argumentation with
respect to a given ordering of structured arguments (elitist or democratic pre-
order) in ASPIC+. In the context of the current paper, this notion could be
defined as follows. Let α = (a1, . . . , an) and β = (b1, . . . , bm) be arguments con-
structed from a PANS. Since we have no Pollock style undercutting argument
(as in ASPIC+) and each norm is assumed to be defeasible, it says that α nor-
mally attacks argument β iff β has a sub-argument β′ s.t. concl(α) = concl(β′),
and r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bm−1, bm)). According to Def. 3.2 and 3.3, the normal
defeat relation is equivalent to the defeat relation using the last link principle
in this paper.
Given a set of arguments A = Arg(P) and a set of defeats R = Def(P,),
we get an argumentation framework (AF) F = (A,R). For a set B ⊆ A, B
is conflict-free iff @α, β ∈ B s.t. (α, β) ∈ R. B defends an argument α iff
∀(β, α) ∈ R, ∃γ ∈ B s.t. (γ, β) ∈ R. The set of arguments defended by B
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in F is denoted as DF (B). A set of B is a complete extension of F , iff B
is conflict-free and B = DF (B). B is a preferred (grounded) extension iff B
is a maximal (resp. minimal) complete extension. B is a stable extension,
iff B is conflict-free, and ∀α ∈ A \ B, ∃β ∈ B s.t. (β, α) ∈ R. We use
sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb} to denote complete, preferred, grounded, or stable
semantics. A set of argument extensions of F = (A,R) is denoted as sem(F).
Then, we write Outfamily for the set of conclusions from the extensions of the
argumentation theory, as in [12].
Definition 3.5 [Conclusion extensions] Given a prioritised abstract normative
system P = 〈L,N, P,A, r〉, let F = (Arg(P),Def(P,)) be the AF constructed
from P. The conclusion extensions, written as Outfamily(P,, sem), are the
conclusions of the ordinary and context arguments in argument extensions.
{{concl(α) | α ∈ S, α is an ordinary or context argument} | S ∈ sem(F)}
Multi-extension semantics can yield different conclusions when norms may
yield multiple most preferred results. Additionally, it is important to note that
conclusions of a PANS are drawn only from ordinary and context arguments.
Example 3.6 [Prioritized triangle, continued] According to Example 3.4, let
A = {A0, . . . , A3}. We have F1 = (A, {(A2, A3)}) where A2 l A3, and
F2 = (A, {(A3, A2)}) where A3 w A2. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb},
Outfamily(P,l, sem) = {{a, p,¬x}}, and Outfamily(P,w, sem) =
{{a, p, x}}.
We now turn our attention to the properties of the argumentation theory
for a PANS. Since all norms in a PANS are defeasible, it is obvious that our
theory maps to the framework of ASPIC+. According to the corresponding
properties in [10], the following three propositions follow directly.
Proposition 3.7 Let F = (A,R) be an AF constructed from a PANS. For
all α, β ∈ A: if α attacks β, then α attacks arguments that have β as a
sub-argument; if α defeats β, then α defeats arguments that have β as a sub-
argument.
Proposition 3.8 (Closure under sub-arguments) Let F = (A,R) be an
AF constructed from a PANS. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈ sem(F),
if an argument α ∈ E, then sub(α) ⊆ E.
Proposition 3.9 (Consistency) Elements of Outfamily are conflict free.
The following two properties formulate the relations between non-argument-
based and argument-based approaches for reasoning with a totally ordered
PANS without permissive norms.
Proposition 3.10 (Greedy is weakest link) Given a totally ordered PANS
P = 〈L,N, P,A, r〉 where P = ∅, and F = (Arg(P), Def(P,w)). It holds
that F is acyclic, and Greedy(P) = concl(E) where E is the unique complete
extension of F .
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Proof. First, since P is totally ordered, under w, the relation w among
arguments is acyclic. Hence, F is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension
under all argumentation semantics mentioned above.
Second, given Greedy(P), let E = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Arg(P) | {a1, . . . , an} ⊆
Greedy(P)}. According to Def. 2.3, it holds that concl(E) = Greedy(P). Now,
we verify that E is a stable extension of F :
(1) Since all premises and the conclusion of each argument of E are con-
tained in Greedy(P) which is conflict-free, it holds that E is conflict-free.
(2) ∀β = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Arg(P) \ E, bm /∈ Greedy(P) (otherwise, if bm ∈
Greedy(P), then (b1, . . . , bm−1) ⊆ Greedy(P), and thus β ∈ E, contradicting to
β /∈ E). Then ∃α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E, s.t. an = bj , 2 ≤ j < m. Then, we have
the following two possible cases:
• (an−1, an) and (bj−1, bj) are applicable at the same time: in this case, since
an ∈ Greedy(P), r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bj−1, bj)). It follows that (a1, . . . , an)
w (b1, . . . , bj). So, β is defeated by α.
• (an−1, an) is applicable, (bj−1, bj) is not applicable: in this case, there are in
turn two possibilities:
· (a1, . . . , an) w (b1, . . . , bj): β is defeated by α.
· (b1, . . . , bj) w (a1, . . . , an): in this case, ∃γ = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ E s.t.: ck =
bi, (c1, . . . , ck) w (b1, . . . , bi), 2 ≤ i < j. Then, β is defeated by γ.
Since E is conflict-free and for all β ∈ Arg(P) \ E, β is defeated by an
argument in E, E is a stable extension. Since F is acyclic, E is the unique
complete extension of F . 2
Proposition 3.11 (Brewka-Eiter is last link) Given a totally ordered
PANS P = 〈L,N, P,A, r〉 where P = ∅, and F = (Arg(P), Def(P,l)). It
holds that BnE(P) = {concl(E) | E ∈ stb(F)}.
Proof. (⇒:) ∀H ∈ BnE(P), let E = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Arg(P) | {a1, . . . , an} ⊆
H}. According to the Brewka-Eiter construction [3], H = concl(E), because
∀a ∈ H, there exists at least one argument (a1, . . . , an) s.t. an = a and
{a1, . . . , an−1} ⊆ H, which is in turn because if an ∈ H, then (an−1, an) is
applicable w.r.t. H, and hence an−1 ∈ H; recursively, we have ai ∈ H for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Let (Args0, Defeats0) be an AF, in which Args0 = {α | sub(α) ⊆ E},
Defeats0 ⊆ Args0×Args0 that is constructed in terms of the last link princi-
ple. It holds that Defeats0 ⊆ Def(P,l). For all α ∈ Args0\E, concl(α) /∈ H.
Then, ∃β ∈ E s.t. concl(α) = concl(β) and β defeats α by using the last link
principle. It follows that E is a stable extension of (Args0, defeats0). Now, let
us prove that E is a stable extension of F .
We need only to verify that for all α ∈ Arg(P) \ Args0, α is defeated by
E. It follows that α has at least one sub-argument (otherwise, it should be
included in E, contradicting α /∈ Args0). Let β be a sub-argument of α such
that β has no sub-argument. It follows that β is in Args0. Then we have the
following two possible cases:
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• β is defeated by E: In this case, α is defeated by E.
• β is not defeated by E: In this case, β is in E (since E is a stable extension).
Then, according to the definition of Args0, the direct super argument of β
(say β′) is in Args0. We in turn have two possible cases similar to the cases
with respect to β. Recursively, we may conclude that α is defeated by E or,
α is in E (this case does not exist).
(⇐:) For all E ∈ stb(F), let P ′ = 〈L,N ′, P ′, A, r′〉 where P ′ = ∅, N ′ = {(>, b) |
(a, b) ∈ N and a ∈ concl(E)}, and r′(>, b) = r(a, b) for all (a, b) ∈ N and
a ∈ concl(E).
Let E′ = {(>, an) | (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E}.
In order to prove that concl(E) is an extension of P in terms of the Brewka-
Eiter construction, according to Proposition 3.10, we only need to verify that
E′ is a stable extension of (Arg(P ′), Def(P ′,′w)) which is an AF of P ′ by
using the weakest link principle. This is true because:
• Since E is conflict-free, E′ is conflict-free.
• For all β′ ∈ Arg(P ′) \ E′, let β be a corresponding argument in Arg(P) \ E
s.t. β = (b1, . . . , bn), β
′ = (>, bn), and all sub-arguments of β are in E.
Since β is not in E, it is defeated by E. Since all sub-arguments of β are not
defeated by E, there exists an argument in E whose conclusion is in conflict
with concl(β) = concl(β′). So, β′ is defeated by E′.
2
4 Weak contraposition
Geffner and Pearl [8] introduces conditional entailment, combining extensional
and conditional approaches to default reasoning. Conditional entailment deter-
mines a prioritization of default knowledge bases. A distinguishing property of
conditional entailment is what we can call weak contraposition, which inspires
our weak contraposition property.
Output under weak contraposition is obtained by adding the contrapositives
of the norms to the permissive norms. The priorities of the permissive norms
are the same as the priorities of the original norms.
Definition 4.1 [Weak contraposition] Let wcp(N) = {〈x, a〉 | (a, x) ∈ N}.
Outfamilywcp(〈L,N, P,A, r〉,, sem) = Outfamily(〈L,N, P ∪ wcp(N), A, r′〉,
, sem), where r′(〈x, a〉) = r((a, x)), and r′((a, x)) = r((a, x)) otherwise.
In the running example we add three contrapositives. Given a contextual
argument a, the undercutting arguments for ¬a do not affect the result, as
they are always defeated by the contextual argument. So the only additional
argument to be considered is the undercutting argument for ¬p. This can block
the argument for p, as required.
Example 4.2 [Prioritized triangle, continued] Consider P1 in Example 2.2,
visualized in Figure 2.a. We have wcp(N) = {〈¬p,¬a〉, 〈x,¬p〉, 〈¬x,¬a〉}, and
assume that contrapositives have the same priority as the original norms, i.e.,
r(wcp(N)) = (1, 3, 2). We have the following arguments:
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A0 a (context argument)
A1 (a, p) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 (a, p)(p,¬x) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 (a, x) : (2) (ordinary argument)
A4 (a, x)〈x,¬p〉 : (2, 3) (undercutting argument)
A5 (a, x)〈x,¬p〉〈¬p,¬a〉 : (2, 3, 1) (undercutting arg.)
A6 (a, p)(p,¬x)〈¬x,¬a〉 : (1, 3, 2) (undercutting arg.)
Argument A0 is not defeated by any argument, and defeats A5 and A6. We
therefore consider only arguments A1 to A4.
As before, A2 attacks A3 and vice versa. In addition, A4 attacks both A1
and A2, A1 attacks A4, and A2 attacks A4.
By using the last link principle, we have that A4 defeats A1 and thus A2;
and that A2 defeats A3 and thus A4. In this case, under the stable and pre-
ferred semantics, there are two extensions {A0, A1, A2} and {A0, A3, A4}. So,
Outfamilywcp(P1,l, sem) = {{a, p,¬x}, {a, x}}, where sem ∈ {prf, stb}.
By using the weakest link principle, we have that A4 defeats A1
and thus A2; and that A3 defeats A2. In this case, for all
sem ∈ {cmp, grd, prf, stb}, {A0, A3, A4} is the only extension. So,
Outfamilywcp(P1,w, sem) = {{a, x}}.
A3A2A1
[(a,p)] [(a,p),(p,¬x)] [(a,x)]
A4
[(a,x),<x,¬p>]
A3A2A1A0
[a]
[(a,p)] [(a,p),(p,¬x)]
[(a,x)]
A4
[(p,¬x)|(a,x)]
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. The prioritized triangle of Example 4.2 (a) and of Example 5.3 (b).
The following proposition shows that the Hansen construction can be repre-
sented in formal argumentation by weakest link, if the set of permissive norms
is extended with the contrapositions of the norms in N . Note that to capture
Hansen’s reading of the prioritized triangle, we need to add more structure to
the example. The proof is along the lines of the proof of Proposition 3.10.
Proposition 4.3 (Hansen is weakest link plus wcp) Given a totally or-
dered PANS P = 〈L, N,P,A, r〉 where P = ∅, P ′ = 〈L, N,P ′, A, r′〉 with
P ′ = wcp(N) and r′(〈x, a〉) = r((a, x)), and r′((a, x)) = r((a, x)) otherwise,
and F = (Arg(P ′), Def(P ′,w)). It holds that Hansen(P) = concl(E) where
E is the set of ordinary arguments of the unique complete extension of F .
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Proof. [Sketch] First, closure under sub-arguments and consistency follow
from Proposition 2 and 3, because we reuse the definitions of weakest link.
Second, P does not have to be totally ordered, as there may be permissive
norms with the same rank as one of the ordinary norms. Thus, it no longer
holds that Arg(P) must be totally ordered under w, and thus F is not neces-
sarily acyclic. Nevertheless, thanks to the properties we imposed on arguments,
there is still only one unique extension under all the argumentation semantics
mentioned above.
Third, let E = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Arg(P) | {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Hansen(P) or ∃i <
n such that ai 6∈ Hansen(P)}. According to Definition 4, it holds that
concl(E) = Hansen(P). Now, we first prove that E is a stable extension of
F :
(1) Since all premises and the conclusion of each argument of E are con-
tained in Hansen(P) which is conflict-free, or one of the premises is not in
Hansen(P), it holds that E is conflict-free.
(2) ∀β = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Arg(P) \ E, bm /∈ Hansen(P) (otherwise, if bm ∈
Hansen(P), then (b1, . . . , bm−1) ⊆ Hansen(P), and thus β ∈ E, contradicting
the requirement that β /∈ E). Then ∃α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E, such that an = bj ,
2 ≤ j < m. The two cases are analogous to the two cases in the proof of
Proposition 3.10.
Since E is conflict-free and for all β ∈ Arg(P) \ E, β is defeated by an
argument in E, E is a stable extension. E is thus the unique complete extension
of F . 2
5 Hang Yourself Arguments
We now introduce another type of argument, the hang yourself argument (ab-
breviated HYA) for prioritized normative systems. HYAs were introduced in
a non-prioritized setting by [4,5] 2 . A HYA is made up of a hypothetical argu-
ment α, and an ordinary argument β, with contradictory conclusions. A third
argument, γ, serves as the premise for α. If argument γ;α (where ; denotes
concatenation of arguments to obtain a super-argument) is an ordinary argu-
ment which conflicts with β, then a contradiction exists, meaning that either
γ or the HYA is invalid.
Definition 5.1 [Hang yourself arguments] Given a prioritized abstract nor-
mative system PANS P = 〈L, N,P,A, r〉.
A hypothetical argument in P is similar to an ordinary argument in Defini-
tion 3.1. The only difference is that in a hypothetical argument, ant(u1) /∈ A.
A hang yourself argument in P , written α|β consists of a hypothetical
argument α and an ordinary argument β with opposite conclusions, such
that for sub-arguments α′, β′ of α and β respectively, we have that if α′ and
β′ have opposite conclusions, then α = α′ and β = β′.
2 They are also called Socratic-style arguments due to their connection with Socratic style
argumentation.
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For convenience, given an argument β;α where β = [(a1, a2), . . . , (ai−1, ai)]
and α = [(ai, ai+1), . . . , (an−1, an)], where (aj , aj + 1) has rank rj , we
write r(β;α−1) to denote the priority obtained from the sequence of ranks
r1, . . . , ri, rn−1, . . . , ri+1.
Definition 5.2 [Defeat for HYAs] A HYA α|β defeats an argument γ iff there
is a sub argument γ′ of γ such that γ′;α is an argument, and r(β;α−1) 6≺ r(γ′).
A HYA α|β is defeated by an argument γ if and only if
(i) γ defeats β; or
(ii) there is a sub argument γ′ of γ such that γ′;α is an argument, and r(γ′) 6≺
r(β;α−1);
Example 5.3 [Prioritized triangle, continued] Consider P1 in Example 2.2,
visualized in Figure 2.b. The only relevant hang yourself argument is
(p, x)|(a,¬x) which defeats (a, p) depending on the ranking of (p, x), (a,¬x).
We thus have the following arguments:
A0 a (context argument)
A1 (a, p) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 (a, p)(p,¬x) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 (a, x) : (2) (ordinary argument)
A4 (p,¬x)|(a, x) : (3), (2) (hang yourself arg.)
A1 and A2 each defeats A4 if (2, 3) 6 (1). A3 defeats A2 if (1, 3) 6 (2). A4
defeats A1 and A2 if (1) and (1, 3) 6 (2, 3) respectively.
For weakest link, A4 defeats A1 and A2, and A3 defeats A2. We therefore
have Outfamily(P1,w, sem) = {{a, x}} for all complete semantics.
An argument containing weak contrapositives may be seen as a kind of
HYA. More precisely, consider an argument A = [(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)], and
another argument B = [(b1, b2), . . . , (bm, an)]. These two arguments result in
a sequence of weak contrapositive arguments:
B; [〈an, an−1〉]
B; [〈an, an−1〉, 〈an−1, an−2〉]
. . .
B; [. . . ; 〈a2, a1〉]
Note that the last argument in the sequence is always defeated by the
context argument. The remaining arguments attack (and may defeat) the
different sub-arguments of A.
We now prove that the hang yourself argument is equivalent to the weak
contrapositive argument.
Proposition 5.4 The HYA δ = [(ai, ai+1), . . . , (an−1, an)]|β is equivalent to
the weak contrapositive argument ω = β; . . . ; (ai+1, ai) in the sense that δ
defeats a subargument α′ of α if and only if ω defeats α′.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ω attacks α′ on its last argu-
ment. Then the rank of ω is r(ω) = r(β), r((an−1, an)), . . . , r((ai, ai+1)). From
Definition 5.2, the HYA defeats α if r(α′) 6 r(ω). Similarly, α defeats the
HYA if r(ω) 6 r(α′). The final situation in which the weak contraposition is
defeated holds if α defeats β. In such a situation, the HYA is also defeated.
Thus, the situation where the weak contraposition defeats (is defeated by) α is
identical to when the HYA defeats (is defeated by) α. 2
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a step towards studying non-monotonic logics through
formal argumentation theory. Here, we begin addressing this challenge by con-
sidering three distinct systems for prioritized nonmonotonic reasoning, showing
that they are different forms of our theory of argumentation. In particular, we
showed how the Greedy approach of prioritized default logic can be repre-
sented by the weakest link principle; the Brewka-Eiter approach of answer set
programming by the last link principle; and the Hansen approach of deontic
logic using the weakest link principle extended with weak contraposition. We
also showed that for weakest link, weak contraposition is a special case of hang
yourself arguments.
While most work in formal argumentation uses very general frameworks
to study argumentation systems, we use a very simple argument system to
study the links between argumentation and prioritized norms. In particular,
we utilised prioritized abstract normative systems, where norms are represented
by a binary relation on literals, priorities are represented by natural numbers,
and all norms have a distinct priority.
The main lessons that can be learned from our results are as follows. The
weakest link principle corresponds to the greedy approach which is computa-
tionally attractive, but conceptually flawed. It should be adopted only when
computational efficiency is the most important property. Thus, to get a more
balanced result, the last link approach seems to be better for a wide number
of potential applications, e.g., multiagent systems. This means that the pros
and cons of both solutions have to be considered, and the decision regarding
which to use depends on the application scenario of interest. Finally, Hansen’s
approach is a sophisticated way to deal with prioritized rules, and can be mod-
eled using weakest link to handle conflicts, as we have shown. Our results are
relevant not only when modelling normative systems, but also potentially when
a developer must make a choice regarding which link principles to use when
developing an argumentation system.
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